Discouraged worker effects and barriers against employment for immigrant and non-immigrant women by Dagsvik, John K. et al.
Discussion 
Papers
Statistics Norway 
Research department
No. 845 •
August 2016
John K. Dagsvik, Tom Kornstad og Terje Skjerpen
Discouraged worker effects and barriers 
against employment for immigrant and 
non-immigrant women
Discussion Papers No. 845, August 2016 
Statistics Norway, Research Department 
John K. Dagsvik, Tom Kornstad and Terje Skjerpen 
Discouraged worker effects and barriers against 
employment for immigrant and non-immigrant 
women 
Abstract: 
A phenomenon observed in many labor markets is that the supply of labor appears to depend on 
business cycles. In other words, workers who are searching for work become “discouraged” under 
unfavorable business cycle conditions because they believe that their chances of finding an 
acceptable job are so small that the costs of searching for work outweigh the benefits from 
searching. In this paper we present a new theoretical framework for job searching based on 
aggregate rational expectations, which is then used to analyze separately the discouraged worker 
effect for married/cohabiting immigrant women from non-Western countries and women born in 
Norway. The empirical results show that the search cost per unit of time is much higher for women 
born in Norway than for immigrant women. This means that an immigrant woman facing the same 
probability of obtaining work as a woman born in Norway is less likely to be discouraged from looking 
for work than a woman born in Norway. However, the actual expected search cost is  on a ve   
higher for immigrant women than for women born in Norway. The reason for this is that the 
probability of obtaining an acceptable job is essentially lower for immigrant women compared to 
women born in Norway. Consequently, the fraction of discouraged workers is, for some groups, 
much higher for immigrant women than for women born in Norway, despite the fact that the search 
costs per unit of time for immigrant women are much lower than those for women born in Norway. 
Keywords: Discouraged workers; Aggregate rational expectations; Female immigrants; Labor force 
participation; Panel data; Random utility modelling. 
JEL classification: C33; C35; J21; J22; J61; J64. 
Acknowledgements: This research was made possible thanks to a grant from the Norwegian 
Research Council, under the project: “Treff: Trygd i kontekst: Rettferdighet, effektivitet, fordeling”, 
project number 199836/H20. We are grateful for comments received at a workshop at the Institute of 
Social Research, Oslo, and for comments by Ådne Cappelen, Arvid Raknerud and Steinar Strøm. 
Address: Terje Skjerpen, Statistics Norway, Research Department. E-mail: tes@ssb.no 
John K. Dagsvik, Research Department. E-mail: jda@ssb.no 
Tom Kornstad, Research Department. E-mail: tko@ssb.no
Discussion Papers comprise research papers intended for international journals or 
books. A preprint of a Discussion Paper may be longer and more elaborate than a 
standard journal article, as it may include intermediate calculations and background 
material etc. 
 
 
 
 
© Statistics Norway 
Abstracts with downloadable Discussion Papers 
in PDF are available on the Internet: 
http://www.ssb.no/en/forskning/discussion-papers 
http://ideas.repec.org/s/ssb/dispap.html 
 
ISSN 1892-753X (electronic) 
3 
 
Sammendrag 
Et fenomen som observeres i mange arbeidsmarkeder, er at yrkesdeltakingen ser ut til å variere i takt med 
konjunktursvingningene. Med andre ord virker det som om arbeidssøkere blir «motløse» når 
konjunkturene er dårlige fordi de tror at sjansene for å finne en akseptabel jobb er så lave at kostnadene 
knyttet til arbeidssøking overstiger verdien av å lete etter arbeid. I denne artikkelen presenterer vi et nytt 
teoretisk rammeverk for analyse av jobbsøking, som deretter er anvendt til å analysere «motløs 
arbeidereffekten». Det er gjennomført separate analyser for gifte/samboende kvinner som har innvandret 
til Norge fra ikke-vestlige land og for gifte/samboende kvinner født i Norge. De empiriske resultatene 
viser at estimater for kostnaden pr. tidsenhet av å søke (som representerer pekuniære og psykologiske 
kostnader) er vesentlig høyere for kvinner født i Norge sammenliknet med innvandrerkvinner. Derimot er 
forventede kostnader ved arbeidssøking høyere for kvinner født i ikke-vestlige land enn for kvinner født i 
Norge. Grunnen til dette er at sannsynligheten for å få en akseptabel jobb er vesentlig lavere for kvinner 
fra ikke-vestlige land enn for kvinner født i Norge. Følgelig er andelen «motløse arbeidere» mye høyere 
for noen grupper av innvandrerkvinner fra ikke-vestlige land enn for kvinner født i Norge, til tross for at 
kostnadene per tidsenhet ved å søke arbeid er vesentlig lavere for innvandrerkvinner fra ikke-vestlige land. 
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1. Introduction 
A common phenomenon observed in many labor markets is that the supply of labor appears to depend on 
business cycles. Workers who are searching for work become “discouraged” under unfavorable business 
cycle conditions because they believe that their chances of finding an acceptable job are so small that the 
costs of searching for work outweigh the expected benefits from searching. The size of this effect is seen 
as depending on the expected search costs. The expected search costs depend on the instantaneous search 
costs (search costs per unit of time) as well as on the chances of finding an acceptable job. Search costs 
include monetary as well as psychological costs.  
 
The discouraged worker effect is of interest for at least two reasons. For economies in a boom, 
discouraged workers provide a hidden source of manpower since they participate to a larger extent in the 
labor market when chances of getting an acceptable job increase. In contrast, if the economy is in a 
recession, potential workers withdraw from the labor market and by doing so they reduce observed 
unemployment.  
 
In a previous paper (Dagsvik et al., 2013) we analyzed the discouraged worker affect among women 
living in Norway without analyzing separately the behavior of immigrant and non-immigrant women. In 
this paper we analyze labor force participation and the discouraged worker effect among immigrant and 
non-immigrant married or cohabiting women. The motivation for comparing these two groups is that the 
proportion of women in paid work is observed to be significantly lower among immigrant women than it 
is among women born in Norway and it is of interest to examine why. There are two explanations that 
have been offered for this phenomenon. Women might decide to search for work but fail to find an 
acceptable job due to barriers against employment. In Norway many immigrant groups seem to experience 
particular difficulties when searching for work and the unemployment rate is significantly higher among 
these groups than it is among women born in Norway, in particular when the economy is in a recession. 
Many immigrant women are from countries where women are not expected to participate in the labor 
market and in addition they tend to have more children than Norwegian-born women. Differences in 
cultural background, then, might be a possible reason for the observed difference in labor supply among 
immigrant women and women born in Norway. In addition, women may decide voluntarily to stay outside 
the labor market because the psychological as well as the monetary costs of searching for work are higher 
than the expected payoff from continuing their search. 
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In this paper we develop a new search-theoretic framework, based on what we call aggregate rationality, 
which differs from the approach in Dagsvik et al. (2013). Our new approach allows the individual agent to 
make errors when assessing the value of search, whereas the restrictions that follow from optimal search 
are supposed to hold on average (across the population). This type of bounded rationality approach has the 
advantage of appearing to be more realistic and it leads to a simple expression of the value of search, as a 
function of search costs and the arrival rate of job offers. From our theoretical approach we derive an 
empirical model for the probability of participating in the labor force. Based on this model we use micro 
data to analyze labor force participation and the discouraged worker effect separately for 
married/cohabiting non-Western immigrants and women born in Norway.   
 
Several studies of the discouraged worker phenomenon are based on macro data (Ehrenberg and Smith, 
1988).1 Empirical studies based on micro data include Ham (1986), Blundell, Ham, and Meghir (1987, 
1998), Connolly (1997), Başlevent and Onaran (2003), Bloemen (2005), and Hotchkiss and Robertson 
(2006), but apart from these there are surprisingly few studies on this phenomenon based on micro data. 
The present study adds to the sparse evidence from these studies by using micro data from the Norwegian 
Labor Force Surveys over a fairly long period of time: that is, for each quarter from the second quarter of 
1988 to the fourth quarter of 2010. The reason why we focus on married women is that this subgroup of 
people is most responsive to market incentives because their incomes do not only depend on own labor 
income but also on income from the husbands.2  
 
The empirical results show that the estimated search cost per unit of time is much higher for women born 
in Norway than for immigrant women. This means that an immigrant woman facing the same probability 
of obtaining work as a woman born in Norway is less likely to be discouraged from looking for work than 
the woman born in Norway. However, the fraction of discouraged workers is, for some groups, much 
higher for immigrant women than for women born in Norway because the estimated expected cost of 
search is, on average, higher for immigrant women than for women born in Norway because the former 
group has lower probability of obtaining an acceptable job. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section the search-theoretic framework is developed. In 
Section 3 the empirical model is derived. Data issues are the topic of Section 4. In Section 5 we provide 
                                                     
1 Some recent studies that have analyzed the discouraged worker issue using macro time series data are Benati (2001), Darby et 
al. (2001), Vendrik and Cörvers (2009), Österholm (2010), and Emerson et al. (2011). All these studies find significant 
discouraged workers effects, at least for subgroups in their samples. 
2 To simplify the verbal exposition, we refer to both these types of female as married in the rest of the paper. 
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estimation results, while in Section 6 we quantify the discouraged worker effect. Section 7 contains 
derived elasticities and results from counterfactual predictions. The conclusions are provided in Section 8. 
2. The theoretical model 
This section discusses a novel approach for characterizing the value of search under uncertainty and with 
bounded rational agents. Although agents may live in a non-stationary environment, we assume that they 
form their optimal policy as if the environment were stationary. Furthermore, we assume that agents have 
only fragmentary information about their chances in the labor market and have knowledge only about the 
unemployment rate for the qualification group they belong to. Also, agents may not be capable of 
determining the value of search precisely, due to the fact that they may be unsure about the distribution of 
the utility of future job opportunities.  
2.1. The conventional search-theoretic approach 
For the sake of comparison it may be useful to start with a short review of the traditional search-theoretic 
approach. In this setup, job offers arrive according to a Poisson process with intensity Λ (say). Let 1U  be 
the present value of search, 2U  the utility of the arriving job offer, and R and C the interest rate and 
instantaneous cost of search. The agent is viewed as uncertain about which and when job offers will 
arrive. However, she is supposed to know R, C, Λ  and the distribution of future values of 2U conditional 
on the workers information, ( )F u . By applying Bellman’s optimality principle (Lippman and McCall, 
1981, p. 220), it follows that 
  1 1 1 2(1 ) (1 ) (max( , )) ( )R t U t U tE U U tC o t+ ∆ = − Λ∆ + Λ∆ − ∆ + ∆

 
where t∆  is a small time change and E  denotes the expectation operator conditional on the information of 
the agent. From this relationship it follows that 
(2.1)  1 1 2( ) max( , )R U E U U CΛ + = Λ −

 
which can also be expressed as 
(2.2)  
1
1 (1 ( )) .
U
U R F u du C
∞
= Λ − −∫   
In principle, one can solve (2.2) for 1U  as a function of R, C, Λ and ( ).F ⋅  The application of (2.2) in 
empirical analysis poses, however, several problems. First, the econometrician does not know the 
information set of the agent, or the distribution function ( ).F u  This distribution function may vary across 
agents because the information set may be individual-specific. Second, the agent may use a highly 
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subjective arrival rate, ,Λ and search cost, C, when computing 1.U  Third, the restriction represented by 
the integral equation in (2.2) is cumbersome to work with. Fourth, perfect rational behavior, as represented 
by (2.2), may not hold because, as indicated above, the agent may have difficulties assessing the precise 
value of 1U − as represented by (2.2), even if she knew perfectly the search cost, job offer arrival rate, the 
interest rate and the conditional c.d.f. of the utility of the arriving job offers.  
 
Finally, a recent laboratory study by Brown et al. (2011) seems to cast serious doubt on conventional 
search theory. They have found that despite the stationarity of the agent’s environment, there is a strong 
tendency of subjects in their experiment to lower their value of search 1U  over elapsed time of search. 
Furthermore, according to their findings it appears that the primary factor determining the time path of 
reservation wages in their experiments is the uncertain wait. 
2.2. The alternative approach based on aggregate rational expectations 
The alternative approach we propose here assumes that the individual agent has very limited information 
about her chances on the labor market and may adjust her arrival rate and distribution of job opportunities 
as time of search increases. This starting point is consistent with the findings of Brown et al. (2011). Thus, 
as time goes without the agent receiving an acceptable job offer she may lower her estimate of the job 
arrival rate and possibly the distribution of 2.U  Hence, in this case the search cost and the job offer 
distribution may depend on elapsed duration of search which we denote S. Consequently, in this case with 
bounded rational behavior (2.1) is replaced by  
 
(2.3)  1 1 2( ( ) ) ( ) ( ) max( ( ), ( )) ( ) ( )S R U S S E U S U S C S + SψΛ + = Λ −  
 
where ( )Sψ  represents a possible (non-systematic) deviation from perfect rational behavior, as 
represented by (2.1), ( )SΛ  and ( )C S  represent the subjective job arrival rate and search cost, depending 
on S. Here, the subjective expectation operator E may also depend on S but this is suppressed in the 
notation above. 
 
Consider now the situation from the observing econometrician’s point of view. The econometrician does 
not observe the individual and subjective job offer distribution, search costs and interest rates. From her 
point of view it is convenient to view these variables as stochastic variables in the sense that they vary 
across the population according to some unknown distributions. Let pE  denote the population expectation 
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operator. That is, pE  is the expectation with respect to the population distribution of 
1 2( ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ).S C S U S U S RΛ  It follows from (2.3) by aggregating across the population that   
 
(2.4) 1 1 2(( ( ) ) ( )) ( ( ) max( ( ), ( ))) ( ( )p p p pE S R U S E S E U S U S E C S)+ E SψΛ + = Λ − . 
 
The equation in (2.4) is still far to general to be useful in an empirical context. Thus, further plausible 
restrictions are called for. To this end we shall make further assumptions. 
Assumption 1 
Equation (2.4) holds with ( ) = 0.pE Sψ  Furthermore, R, ( ),SΛ  are independent (with respect to the 
population distribution). 
 
Note that for a given agent ( )SΛ and 1( )Sε  will most likely depend on S. For example, it is likely that 
( )SΛ  is decreasing in S for a given individual. However, when agents are observed only once in each 
unemployment spell it may not be unrealistic to assume that ( ),SΛ 1( )U S , and 2 ( )U S  are independent, 
and also that they only depend on S in a non-systematic way. 
Assumption 2 
The stochastic variables 0 ,U 1( )U S  and 2 ( )U S  have the following structure: 
1( )j j jU S u θ ε
−= +   
for j = 1, 2, and  
1
0 0 0U u θ ε
−= +    
 
where { }ju  are deterministic functions, 0 1 2
{ , , }ε ε ε  are independent and identically distributed random 
error terms with a given distribution, and θ  is a positive scalar. Moreover, 0 1 2{ , , }ε ε ε  are stochastically 
independent of S and of ( ).SΛ  
 
The random error terms, 0 1,ε ε and 2ε  are supposed to capture the effect of unobservables that may or may 
not be perfectly known to the agent. These error terms depend on S in a non-systematic manner but for 
simplicity this is suppressed in the notation above. The parameter θ  represents the precision of the 
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random error term and 2θ − is proportionate to the corresponding variance. Evidently, 2ε  is only known to 
the agent upon arrival of the associated job offer, as well as factors such as moods and whims, implying 
that the utilities fluctuate from one moment to the next in a way that cannot fully be predicted by the 
agent. In order to justify the distributional properties of the random error terms 0 1 2{ , , }ε ε ε , we shall make 
a further assumption. To this end let Ω  be a set consisting of the alternatives “working”, “searching for 
work”, and “out of the labor force”. Let B ⊂Ω  where B contains at least two alternatives and let ( )J B  
denote the most preferred alternative in B.  
Assumption 3 
The distribution of the error terms 0 1 2, ,ε ε ε  is such that  
        ( ( ) | ( ) ) ( ( ) )P J j J B P J B jΩ = Ω ∈ = =   
for .j B∈ ⊆Ω   
 
The above relationship states that given that the most preferred alternative belongs to B, then the 
probability of choosing alternative j from Ω  is equal to the probability of choosing j from B. Luce (1977) 
refers to the assumption expressed in (2.5) as a probabilistic rationality postulate, and it is in fact 
equivalent to the property known as Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA).  
Theorem 1 
Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 it follows that the stochastic error terms 0 1 2, ,ε ε ε  are distributed according 
to the extreme value distribution with c.d.f.  
 
(2.5)  exp( exp(0.5772 ))x− −   
 
for real x. Moreover, 
 
(2.6)  1 1 21 log(exp( ) exp( ))
r cu u uθ θ θ
l l
 + + = + 
 
 
 
where ,pr E R=  ( )pc E C S=  and ( ).pE Sl = Λ When 1 / 1,r l+ ≅  then a closed form solution for 1u  is 
given by  
 
10 
 
(2.7)  1 2 log(exp( / ) 1)).u u cθ θ l= − −  
 
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix A. Equation (2.6) determines 1u  uniquely as a function of  r, 
c, l , and 2.u  A great advantage in empirical contexts is that 1u  does not depend on S or the individual 
costs, job offer arrival rates and distribution of the utilities of job offers. Note that the relationship in (2.7) 
has the intuitively reasonable property that when the mean cost of search / 0c l → , then 1 .u →∞ This 
property follows because when search costs are small there is no substantial loss of welfare in remaining 
unemployed. Note that since our theoretical approach is based on aggregate rational expectation, there are 
no further restrictions on the error terms other than those given in (2.6) or (2.7).  
2.3. Choice probabilities 
So far we have only considered the distributional properties of the random terms of the utility functions at 
a given point in time. The next assumption deals with the serial dependence structure of the random error 
terms.  
Assumption 4 
The random error terms { }ijtε  have the structure ,ijt ijt ijZε ε= +  where , 0,1,2,ijt jε = are independent 
random variables that are serially independent and ,ijZ j = 0, 1, are independent random variables that are 
constant over time and are independent of { }.ijtε  The distributions of { }ijZ  and { }ijtε  satisfy the condition 
 
( ( ) | ( ) ,{ }) ( ( ) |{ })it it ir it irP J j J B Z P J B j ZΩ = Ω ∈ = =   
for .j B∈ ⊆Ω   
 
Similarly to Assumption 3, Assumption 4 is an assertion about conditional probabilistic rationality given 
the random effects, and it is equivalent to IIA, conditional on{ }.ijZ  In fact, the conditional probabilistic 
rationality property asserted in Assumption 4 seems more reasonable than the corresponding 
unconditional statement in Assumption 3. This is so because it is well known that even if IIA holds at a 
disaggregate level it may not hold at a more aggregate level. Taken together one could express the 
assertion of Assumptions 3 and 4 as a statement that probabilistic rationality being invariant under 
aggregation of unobservables. 
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Theorem 2 
Assume that Assumptions 2, 3 and 4 hold. Let 0 1.i i iZ Z Z= −  Then ijtε  has the same distribution as .ijtαε  
Furthermore 
 
(2.8)  1 0 1 1 1
0 1
1( | )
1 exp( )i t i t i i t i t i
P U U Z
u u Zθα θα α− − −
> =
+ − +
 
 
And 
 
(2.9)  1 0
0 1
1( )
1 exp( )i t i t i t i t
P U U
u uθ θ
> =
+ −
 
 
where α is a parameter, 0 1,α< ≤  that is related to the variance by   
 
(2.10)   ( )
2
21 .
3i
VarZ πα= −   
 
The random effect iZ  has p.d.f. ( )f z  defined on ( , )−∞ ∞  and given by 
 
(2.11)   1 sin( )( ) .
2cos( )z z
f z
e e
απ
απ απ−
= ⋅
+ +
  
 
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Dagsvik (2016) but in order to make this paper self-contained it is 
reproduced in Appendix A.3 The distribution of 1iZ α
−  is symmetric around zero and has variance that 
increases without bounds as 0.α → The distribution has more mass close to the origin than a 
corresponding normal distribution. In Figure A1 in Appendix A we have plotted the probability density of 
1
iZ α
−  for 0.5.α =  From (2.10) we note that the variance of iZ  decreases toward zero as α  approaches 1. 
Thus, the parameter α  is an alternative measure of the dispersion of the random effect. Furthermore, it is 
easy to show that the structure of the error terms implies that  
 
                                                     
3 The results in Theorem 2 are related to results obtained by Cardell (1997). He proves that if the random effect is distributed as in 
(2.9) then (2.9) follows from (2.8). 
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  2( , ) 1 .ijt ijsCorr ε ε α= −   
It is interesting to note that under the above assumption of aggregate rational expectations, information 
about expected search costs computed by using the arrival rate of job offers can be achieved by using the 
arrival rate of acceptable job offers. To see this let µ  be the intensity of acceptable job offers. We have  
 
(2.12)   2 1
1 2
( ) .
1 exp( )
P U U
u u
l
µ l
θ θ
= > =
+ −
 
 
When inserting for 1u  given by (2.7) into (2.12) we obtain  
 
(2.13)   / .
1 exp( / )
c c
c
l
µ l
=
− −
 
It is easy to show that the right-hand side of (2.13) is strictly increasing in / .c l  The relation in (2.13) 
shows that there is a one-to-one correspondence between /c µ  and / .c l  Note that when /c l  is large, 
(2.7) and (2.13) imply that  
 
(2.14)   1 2 2/ / .u u c u cθ θ l θ µ≅ − ≅ −   
3. Empirical model 
In this section it is convenient to introduce indexation of time and individuals. Let itq  denote the 
probability that individual i shall receive an acceptable job offer at time t. In most cases the individuals do 
not have information about the arrival intensity of acceptable jobs, .µ  They have, at most, information 
about the unemployment rate for specific groups. This observation motivates the next assumption. 
Assumption 5 
The average expected search cost is approximately equal to 1( 1)itq c
− −   where c  is a constant.  
 
The implication of Assumption 5 is that (2.14) is approximated by the relation 
(3.1)  11 2 ( 1).it it itu u c qθ θ
−= − −  
The relation in (3.1) has the plausible property that the expected search cost is zero when itq  = 1.  
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Assumption 6 
The value of an arriving job offer is given by 
 
(3.2)  2 logi t it itU W η= +   
 
where itW  is the agent-specific wage rate, while itη  is a term that is supposed to account for the value of 
non-pecuniary attributes associated with the job offer. The wage equation is given by 
 
(3.3)  0log it t it itW Xβ β δ= + +   
 
where the intercept 0tβ  may depend on time, itX is a vector of covariates containing  length of schooling, 
potential experience, and potential experience squared and itδ is a random term with zero mean. The 
systematic part of the utility of being out of the labor force is given by 
 
(3.4)  0i t itu V γ= −  
 
where itV  is a vector containing 1, age, age squared, real non-labor income, the number of children aged 
0–3 years, the number of children aged 4–6 years, and the number of children aged 7–18 years. The 
probability itq is a logit function depending on a vector of covariates containing 1, length of schooling, 
potential experience, and potential experience squared, duration of stay, real non-labor income and time 
dummies. 
 
As usual, potential experience is defined as age minus length of schooling minus 7. For non-Western 
women we also include a second-order polynomial in duration of stay in the wage equation, while for 
women born in Norway we include a dummy for urbanity.  
 
 It follows from (3.2) that 2i tU  can be interpreted as the modified wage rate, where the modification is due 
to other attributes of the job than salary. The wage equation in (3.3) is introduced to allow us to predict 
wage rates for those women who do not work. Both itδ  and itη  are supposed to capture the effects of 
unobservables and are therefore perceived as random variables by the researcher. It follows from (3.2) and 
(3.3) that we can write 
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  12 0 0 2log log logη β β δ η β β θ ε
−= + = + + + = + +i t it it t it it it t it i tU W X X   
 
where 2i tε  has the interpretation as ( )2 log .ε θ δ η= +i t it it  Recall that 2i tε is assumed to follow the c.d.f. 
given in (2.5). Hence the above equation implies that 
 
(3.5)   2 0 .i t t itu Xβ β= +   
 
Since the number of observations in the respective subgroups of individuals in the labor force is rather 
small the logit model for itq  is introduced in order to obtain more reliable predictions than the 
corresponding observed fractions.  
 
From Theorem 2 and Assumptions 5 and 6 it follows that 
 
(3.8)     1 0( ) ( | )it i i t i t iP Z P U U Z≡ >  1 1 1
0
1
1 exp( ( ) (1 / 1) )t it it it iX V c q Zθα β β γ θα α
− − −= + − + − + − +
. 
 
Furthermore, it follows from the analysis above that 
 
(3.9)      1 0( ) ( )it it i i t i tP EP Z P U U≡ = >  
 
        0 1 0
0
1( ( ) (1 / ) 1) ) .
1 exp( ( ) (1 / 1))t it it i t it i t t it it it
P X c q V
X V c q
θ β β ε θ γ ε
θ β β γ θ
= + − − + > − + =
+ − + + + −


 
 
Our sample has a rotating panel structure. In order to express the likelihood function, let 1itY =  if the 
woman is in the labor force in year t and zero otherwise. Consequently, we can write the log-likelihood 
function as 
 
(3.10)  , 1 , 111 , 1 , 1( ) (1 ( )) ( ) (1 ( ))i t i tit it
Y YY Y
it i it i i t i i t i
i t
L E P Z P Z P Z P Z− −−− − −
 
= − − 
 
∏ ∏       
 
where the expectation operator is taken with respect to .iZ  To calculate (3.10) we apply a Monte Carlo 
simulation approach. That is, we approximate L by L  given by 
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(3.11)  ( ), 1 , 1111 , 1 , 1
1
( ) (1 ( )) ( ) (1 ( ))i t i tit it
M
Y YY Y
it ir it ir i t ir i t ir
ri t
L M P Z P Z P Z P Z− −−−− − −
=
= − −∑∏ ∏       
 
where , 1,2,..., ,irZ r M=  are independent simulated copies of .iZ  For a detailed description of the 
simulation procedure, see Appendix B. 
 
As previously mentioned, since we do not have precise estimates of itq , we estimate a logit model for itq  
based on the subsample of women who are in the labor force. An alternative specification would be to use 
more aggregate versions of the probabilities { }itq  to represent the women’s information about their 
chances in the labor market. For example, one could use the aggregate unemployment rate as an estimate 
of 1 .q−  In principle, one could estimate corresponding versions of the model and check which of them 
are better able to explain the data. However, in our case this seems difficult because the data do not cover 
a sufficiently long time period to ensure reliable identification of the discouraged worker effect without 
using variations in itq  across individuals.  
4. Data 
The data are obtained by linking information from the Norwegian Labor Force Surveys (LFS) 1988–2010 
with information from the Norwegian Educational Database, the Norwegian Tax Return Registries 1988–
1992, the Norwegian Income Registries 1993–2010, and the Population Registry with information about 
family composition. All registers are linked using a personal identification key.  
 
In the selection of the sample we include only married women aged 25–60 years. In Norway many women 
give birth to a child around the age of 23 and most women are entitled to paid maternity leave of about 
one year. A relatively large proportion of women aged less than 25 years are also enrolled in education. 
By using a lower age limit of 25 years, most of the females in these two groups are omitted from the 
analysis. The reason for the upper age limit is that most women are working in the public sector and there 
they are entitled to early retirement schemes at age 62 years.4 In addition to the selection based on age and 
marital status, we also exclude women who are disabled or claim that they are unable to work. Self-
employed women and women hired in firms run by family members are also excluded.     
                                                     
4 Norway has an early retirement program for workers. It was introduced for the first time in 1988, originally only for those aged 
66 years working in firms that were participating in the program. Today the program covers most workers aged 62−66 years. 
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Using answers to a wide range of questions in the LFS, we can classify a person as being employed, 
unemployed, or outside the labor force. People are asked about their position in the labor market during a 
particular week. For a person to be defined as unemployed, she must not be employed during the survey 
week, she must have been actively seeking work during the preceding four weeks, and she must wish to 
return to work within the next two weeks. 
 
Working time is measured as contractual hours of work on an annual basis in both the main and any 
possible second job. If this information is missing and the respondent is active in the labor market, 
information about actual working time is used. The Income Registries 1993−2010 are used to obtain 
information about wage income used in the calculation of hourly wages and non-labor income. In order to 
cover as many periods of business cycle fluctuations as possible (periods of high and low unemployment 
rates), we have chosen to extend the period of analysis in excess of the period covered by these registers. 
For this period—that is, the years 1988−1992—we use the Tax Return Registries to obtain information 
about wage income. Compared with the Income Registries, these registries do not include very detailed 
information about different types of income. To ensure time consistency, we have chosen to use a measure 
of non-labor income that includes salary of the husband as well as stipulated labor income for self-
employed husbands even though the Income Registries allow the inclusion of capital income. Nominal 
hourly wages are measured as labor income divided by (formal) annual working time, as defined above. 
The nominal hourly wage and non-labor income variables are deflated by using the official Norwegian 
consumer price index, with 2010 as the base year. The number of children in each household aged 0−3 
years, 4−6 years, and 7−18 years for the years 1993−2010 are calculated from information in the Income 
Registries. In addition to income information these registries include sufficient information to determine 
household composition with respect to adults and children and their age.  For the remaining years, 
1988−1992, this calculation is based on information from the Population Registry. A potential advantage 
of using the Income Registries for calculating the number of children is that this source gives the number 
of children actually living in the household. Education is measured in years of achieved level of schooling.   
 
The Norwegian LFS are quarterly and the sample is rotating. In the estimation of the main model in this 
paper, we make use of the fact that it is possible to observe a person in the same quarter in two 
consecutive years. Thus each woman in the sample is observed twice, and by observing women in the 
same quarter in both years, we avoid problems related to seasonal fluctuations within the year. Note, 
however, that the sample includes observations from all of the four quarters during a year. The reason we 
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exclude women who can be observed only once is that the behavior of this group of women in the labor 
market seems to be fundamentally different from that of other women.5  
 
The empirical analysis is done separately for women born in Norway and what we refer to as non-Western 
immigrants. Non-Western immigrants include immigrants born in Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia, and South 
and Central America. Thus we have excluded immigrants born in Western and Oceanian countries 
(including Australia) and North America. The reason we exclude these immigrants is that we want to 
focus on immigrants with a substantially different cultural background compared to those born in Norway.  
 
To predict wages we estimate a wage equation separately for immigrant women and women born in 
Norway. The specification includes random effects in order to account for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity, see Table C1 in Appendix C.  The predictions of the qs are based on the same approach as 
for wages and essentially the same dataset, but now the logit model is used. By neglecting the panel data 
design in these estimations, we simplify and assume that the binary outcomes are independent also for 
observations that are from the same observational unit. As is evident from the estimation results in Table 
C2 in Appendix C , model specifications are also somewhat different with respect to explanatory 
variables. Work experience is included only in the specification for women born in Norway, while this 
variable is replaced by duration of stay for immigrant women. For both groups the sets of explanatory 
variables are expanded by including the log of the real non-labor income and the number of children aged 
0–3 years and 4–6 years respectively. 
 
In total the samples consist of 52,101 women born in Norway and 1,724 immigrant women. Table 1 gives 
summary statistics for the women for three selected years, while Tables D1–D4 in Appendix D give 
additional information about the sample: that is, the distribution of women across regions of birth and 
periods and their transitions in the labor market (for selected years). In addition the appendix also includes 
information about sample selection in the estimation of the wage- and q-relations and summary statistics 
of the predictions based on the q-relation. From Table 1 we notice that there is a positive trend in labor 
market participation over time for both groups of women. The participation rate is significantly higher for 
women born in Norway than for immigrant women, while the unemployment rate is significantly higher 
for immigrant women compared to Norwegian-born women. For both groups of women the mean 
unemployment rate (defined as the mean of 1- qit of the women in the group in a specific period) shows 
                                                     
5 One of the most frequent reasons for people not taking part in the LFS is the difficulty of getting in contact with them. 
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business cycle fluctuations over the years covered by the sample, but the unemployment rate among 
immigrants is more sensitive to fluctuations than the unemployment rate among women born in Norway. 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics for women born in non-Western countries and women born in Norway. 
Selected years 
 Women born in non-Western 
countries 
Women born in Norway 
Variable No. of obs. Mean Std. dev. No. of obs. Mean Std. dev. 
Year 1988       
       
Age 29 34.6 7.5 2466 40.8 9.1 
Education (years) 29 11.7 3.4 2466 10.9 2.4 
Experience (years) 29 15.9 8.4 2466 22.9 9.9 
# children 0–3 years 29 0.4 0.6 2466 0.2 0.5 
# children 4–6 years 29 0.3 0.6 2466 0.2 0.4 
# children 7–18 years 29 0.8 1.0 2466 0.8 0.9 
Non-labor incomea 29 249,659 152,529 2466 328,099 153,382 
Wage ratea 29 111.5 15.0 2466 125.8 12.4 
Participation rate 29 0.586 0.50 2466 0.82 0.39 
Unemployment rate 17 0.059 0.24 2014 0.022 0.15 
       
Year 1999       
       
Age 134 37.1 7.3 3796 42.0 9.5 
Education (years) 134 12.4 3.3 3796 12.6 2.8 
Experience (years) 134 18.6 7.5 3796 23.4 10.4 
# children 0–3 years 134 0.4 0.6 3796 0.3 0.5 
# children 4–6 years 134 0.2 0.5 3796 0.2 0.5 
# children 7–18 years 134 0.9 1.1 3796 0.7 1.0 
Non-labor incomea 134 343,531 185,439 3796 385,643 185,243 
Wage ratea 134 120.0 16.5 3796 135.3 15.2 
Participation rate 134 0.75 0.44 3796 0.91 0.29 
Unemployment rate 100 0.060 0.24 3452 0.013 0.11 
       
Year 2009       
       
Age 220 38.2 8.2 2566 45.1 8.9 
Education (years) 220 13.2 3.7 2566 13.7 2.8 
Experience (years) 220 18.9 9.2 2566 25.5 10.1 
# children 0–3 years 220 0.3 0.6 2566 0.2 0.5 
# children 4–6 years 220 0.2 0.4 2566 0.2 0.4 
# children 7–18 years 220 0.8 1.0 2566 0.8 1.0 
Non-labor incomea 220 414,091 222,906 2566 515,718 256,768 
Wage ratea 220 173.8 24.3 2566 207.9 23.1 
Participation rate 220 0.868 0.34 2566 0.96 0.19 
Unemployment rate 191 0.021 0.14 2470 0.008 0.09 
a At constant 2010 NOK. 
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5. Estimation results 
Estimation of the participation model requires estimates of the wage equation as well as of the model for 
the probability of getting an acceptable job offer for each woman. Estimations are done separately for 
immigrant and non-immigrant women, on samples of employed women observed either once or twice. 
Tables C1 and C2 in Appendix C report the estimation results for the wage equation and the job offer 
probability.6  
 
In Table 2 we report estimates of the parameters in (3.10) for, respectively, women born in Norway and 
women born in non-Western countries. From the table we notice that the estimate of ,α  which represents 
the strength of serial correlation in the participation decision, is somewhat higher for the women born in 
non-Western countries than it is for those born in Norway, whereas the estimates of the parameterθ  go in 
the opposite direction. A striking result in Table 2 is how different the estimates of the parameter 
associated with the discouraged worker effect are between women born in Norway and women born in 
non-Western countries. The estimate for women born in Norway is more than three times as large as the 
estimate for women born in non-Western countries. We interpret this finding as being due to different 
psychological costs. Non-Western immigrant women often come from economies where unemployment is 
high and accordingly it may be hard to get job offers. They are more used to demanding labor market 
conditions than women born in Norway, who are used to much more favorable labor market conditions. 
Consequently, immigrant women who are interested in entering the labor force will not be so easily 
discouraged as women born in Norway. Also the estimate of the parameter related to real non-labor 
income deviates notably. This estimate is substantially larger for women born in Norway than it is for 
women born in non-Western countries. Besides, the estimate for the latter group is on the border of being 
insignificant at the 5 per cent level. The estimates of the parameters determining the effects of children are 
fairly equal for the two groups. For women born in Norway the smallest effect is found for children in the 
oldest age group, whereas for women born in non-Western countries the smallest estimate is found for 
children in the middle age group.   
 
The model parameterization adopted in this paper differs from the one used in Dagsvik et al. (2013). In 
order to facilitate comparison of estimates for the model of women born in Norway with the 
corresponding estimates obtained by Dagsvik et al. (2013), we display comparable estimates in Table E1 
in Appendix E (obtained from Table 2). Apart from the estimate of the parameter representing search costs 
                                                     
6 In a preliminary stage we have used Heckman’s two-stage procedure for controlling for self-selection, but we found no 
significant selection effect. 
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and non-labor income, the other estimates are quite close. Recall that in this paper we use panel data that 
are selected in a different way than the sample used by Dagsvik et al. (2013). Also, in contrast to this 
paper, the analysis of Dagsvik et al. (2013) did not distinguish between women born in Norway and 
immigrant women. One cannot therefore expect the empirical results to be the same. 
 
Table 2. Empirical results for immigrant women and women born in non-Western countries and 
women born in Norway  
 Women born in non-
Western countries 
Women born in Norway 
Variable/parameter Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
θ 3.011 8.874 4.237 42.195 
dw, c   0.753 5.103 2.307 14.434 
Constant, γ1 -4.735 -11.981 -4.194 -57.155 
Age, γ2 0.046 2.170 0.019 5.335 
(Age/10)2, γ3 -0.073 -2.733 -0.040 -9.449 
(real non-lab. inc)×  10-5, γ4 -0.018 -1.956 -0.025 -15.903 
No. of children 0-3, γ5 -0.305 -6.760 -0.199 -28.780 
No. of children 4-6, γ6 -0.072 -2.224 -0.147 -22.804 
No. of children 7-18, γ7 -0.106 -5.236 -0.075 -18.221 
α 0.450 13.568 0.344 56.524 
No. of obs. 3448  104,202  
No. of obs. units observed twice 1724  52,101  
Log-likelihood -1424.8  -25562.9  
M 150  150  
6. The discouraged worker effect and barriers against employment 
In Dagsvik et al. (2013) a model-based definition of the discouraged worker effect was proposed. This 
definition goes as follows. For simplicity, denote by ( )it itP q  the probability of labor force participation of 
worker i at time (year) t as a function of the probability of getting a job upon search, .itq  The probability 
(1)itP  represents the probability of labor force participation under the ideal reference case when 1.itq =  
Thus, under this reference case, the probability of worker i of being discouraged in year t equals
(1) ( ).it it itP P q−  We define (1) ( )it it itP P q−  as the discouraged effect for individual i. This effect depends 
crucially on the condition that the women’s information about their chances of obtaining an acceptable job 
upon search is, on average, captured reasonably well by the specified probabilities { }.itq  Thus the  
discouraged worker effect depends on the size of the search cost parameter, c , as well as on the size of the 
probability of getting an acceptable job, .itq  In Table 3 we have displayed the overall discouraged worker 
effect and the employment and labor force participation rates for the two groups of women we are 
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studying. In Tables 4 and 5 we present the corresponding figures for subgroups within immigrant women 
and women born in Norway, respectively.   
 
Table 3. Observed and predicted participation rates, predicted job probability (q), predicted 
discouraged worker (DW) effect, and predicted employment rate 
 Participation rate q DW effect Employment 
rate 
Period Obs. Std. dev. Pred. Pred. Pred. Pred. 
Women born in non-Western countries     
       
1988–1990 0.714 0.032 0.749 0.910 0.050 0.681 
1991–1993 0.665 0.024 0.643 0.781 0.163 0.517 
1994–1996 0.648 0.020 0.657 0.779 0.159 0.532 
1997–1999 0.725 0.023 0.779 0.942 0.035 0.734 
2000–2002 0.749 0.022 0.778 0.860 0.073 0.677 
2003–2005 0.776 0.018 0.759 0.838 0.095 0.640 
2006–2008 0.845 0.014 0.827 0.902 0.043 0.746 
2009–2010 0.865 0.019 0.852 0.906 0.036 0.772 
1988–2010 0.752 0.007 0.755 0.859 0.086 0.659 
      
Women born in Norway      
       
1988–1990 0.829 0.003 0.834 0.967 0.044 0.839 
1991–1993 0.856 0.002 0.862 0.964 0.041 0.840 
1994–1996 0.880 0.002 0.876 0.966 0.037 0.847 
1997–1999 0.907 0.003 0.887 0.987 0.013 0.893 
2000–2002 0.927 0.003 0.920 0.975 0.020 0.878 
2003–2005 0.937 0.002 0.933 0.972 0.019 0.878 
2006–2008 0.953 0.002 0.956 0.984 0.008 0.913 
2009–2010 0.967 0.003 0.969 0.988 0.004 0.929 
1988–2010 0.891 0.001 0.889 0.972 0.028 0.865 
 
From Table 3 we note that the discouraged worker effect is in general much larger for immigrant women 
than for women born in Norway. For the period 1988–2010 the average discouraged worker effect is about 
three times as high for women born in non-Western countries (8.6 per cent versus 2.8 per cent) as for 
women born in Norway. As discussed above, the reason is that although our estimates indicate that the 
psychological search costs are substantially lower for immigrant women than for women born in Norway, 
the probability of getting an acceptable job is much lower for immigrant women.  
 
To check the reasonableness of our discouraged worker estimates, let us compare our results with those 
obtained by Blundell et al. (1998), the paper closest in spirit to our work. Since the unemployment rate in 
their sample is rather high (between 10 per cent and 13 per cent), it only makes sense to compare their 
results with ours for immigrant women during years with similar levels of unemployment. The 
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discouraged worker effect is about 6.2 per cent in their sample. In our case the unemployment rate for 
immigrant women is on average about 14.1 per cent and the corresponding discouraged worker effect is 
about 8.6 per cent. During 2006–2008 the unemployment rate among immigrant women is about 9.8 per 
cent and the corresponding discouraged worker effect is about 4.2 per cent. Hence the order of magnitude 
of the discouraged worker effect among immigrant women is similar to the findings of Blundell et al. 
(1998). 
 
In Table 4 we have divided immigrant women into 12 subgroups depending on their duration of stay in 
Norway, their actual education, and their actual age when they participated in the LFS. The last column of 
the table shows the number of observations in each group in our sample. As regards barriers against 
employment, we note that the unemployment rate for young immigrant women with a low level of 
schooling and a short time since arrival (group 1) is high, about 25 per cent decreasing to about 16 per 
cent for group 6, where time since arrival has increased to 5–10 years and the women are aged 35+. The 
lowest barrier/unemployment rate among immigrant women is in group 12, which contains women with 
high education, aged 45+, who have been in Norway for more than 10 years. In contrast, the 
unemployment rate for women born in Norway is much lower for all levels of education and age. For this 
group the unemployment rate varies between 1 per cent and 6 per cent.  
 
As discussed earlier, unfortunately the unemployment rate will not capture the full extent of barriers 
against employment due to the discouraged worker effect. Taking into account both the discouraged 
worker effect and the unemployment rate in Table 4, about 18 per cent of young immigrant women with a 
high level of schooling and a short time since arrival would like to work if they could find an acceptable 
job (group 3), whereas about 30 per cent of young immigrant women with a low level of schooling and a 
short time since arrival (group 1) would like to work if they could find an acceptable job. The 
corresponding effect for immigrant women aged more than 40 years with a high level of schooling and a 
long time since arrival (group 12) is about 5 per cent. Thus we conclude that barriers against employment 
are substantial for some immigrant women. For Norwegian-born women the barriers are much smaller. 
About 13 per cent of young women born in Norway with a low level of schooling (group 1) would like to 
work if they could find an acceptable job. The corresponding figure for young women born in Norway 
with a high level of schooling is about 3 per cent (group 2). For the two other groups the barriers are quite 
small.  
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One factor behind the variation in the difference between employment and participation rates over time is 
related to the rotating sample survey design underlying the data. The distribution of individual 
qualifications may vary substantially from one year to the next. 
 
Table 4. Predicted participation rates, predicted job probability (q), predicted discouraged worker 
effect, and predicted employment rate for selected groups. Women born in non-Western countries 
 Group Duration 
of stay 
(D) 
Length of 
education 
(E) 
Age 
(A) 
Partici-
pation 
q DW 
effect 
Employ-
ment 
No. of 
obs. 
1 D ≤ 5 E ≤ 13 A < 35 0.568 0.745 0.169 0.441 405 
2 D ≤ 5 E ≤ 13 A ≥ 35 0.641 0.749 0.154 0.495 250 
3 D ≤ 5 E > 13 A < 35 0.798 0.846 0.060 0.678 250 
4 D ≤ 5 E > 13 A ≥ 35 0.861 0.877 0.036 0.757 108 
5 5< D ≤ 10 E ≤ 13 A < 35 0.626 0.797 0.122 0.515 336 
6 5< D ≤ 10 E ≤ 13 A ≥ 35 0.733 0.835 0.081 0.619 349 
7 5< D ≤ 10 E > 13 A < 35 0.813 0.873 0.048 0.714 137 
8 5< D ≤ 10 E > 13 A ≥ 35 0.862 0.903 0.027 0.779 188 
9 D > 10 E ≤ 13 A < 40 0.758 0.899 0.045 0.687 470 
10 D > 10 E ≤ 13 A ≥ 40 0.821 0.920 0.029 0.758 425 
11 D > 10 E > 13 A < 40 0.874 0.948 0.014 0.829 213 
12 D > 10 E > 13 A ≥ 40 0.893 0.953 0.011 0.852 317 
 
Table 5. Predicted participation rates, predicted discourage worker effect, and predicted 
employment rate for selected groups. Women born in Norway 
Current 
group 
Length of 
education (E) 
Age 
(A) 
Participation q DW       
effect 
Employment No. of 
obs. 
1 E ≤ 13 A < 35 0.806 0.941 0.080 0.761 17329 
2 E ≤ 13 A ≥ 35 0.885 0.974 0.024 0.862 56573 
3 E > 13 A < 35 0.929 0.978 0.014 0.909 8808 
4 E > 13 A ≥ 35 0.952 0.990 0.005 0.942 21492 
7. Elasticities and counterfactual predictions 
One way of assessing counterfactual predictions is to compute marginal effects or corresponding 
elasticities. Following Dagsvifk et al. (2013), we have computed selected quasi-elasticities (Cramer, 
2001), defined as follows:  
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where 4i tV  is non-labor income (the fourth component of the vector it
V ) and 4γ  the associated parameter. 
The quasi-unemployment elasticity is given by 
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∂
= = −
∂ −
  
 
In Table 6, we report the mean of the estimated elasticities for women born in Norway and women born in 
non-Western countries for selected years. The wage elasticity is somewhat higher for women born in non-
Western countries than it is for women born in Norway. Note that (1 )it itP P− attains its maximal value 
when 0.5.itP = Since labor participation is typically lower for women born in non-Western countries than it 
is for women born in Norway and the estimate of θ  is almost the same for both groups, a lower wage 
elasticity is obtained for the latter group. Furthermore, since labor participation probability tends to grow 
over time, the absolute value of the elasticities tends to decrease over time.  
 
The quasi-elasticity with respect to non-labor income is quite small for both groups even though the 
estimate of the parameters associated with non-labor income is substantially higher for women born in 
Norway than it is for women born in non-Western countries. The mean quasi-unemployment elasticity is 
higher for women born in Norway than it is for women born in non-Western countries. Note that the terms 
(1 )it itP P−  and 21/ itq  work in the opposite direction.  
 
Our primary concern in this paper is the discouraged worker effect. The quasi-elasticities of the 
discouraged worker effect with respect to wage and non-labor income are given by:  
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Mean quasi-elasticities for the discouraged worker effects for selected years are reported in Table 7. For 
both groups of women an increase in the real wage rate decreases the probability of being discouraged. In 
some periods the effect is stronger for women born in Norway, in other periods it is stronger for women 
born in non-Western countries. An increase in real non-labor income leads to an increase in the probability 
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of being discouraged. The estimated quasi-elasticities with respect to real non-labor income are quite low 
for both groups. 
 
An advantage of using a structural approach to labor market participation modeling is that one might make 
counterfactual calculations for individuals with special characteristics in order to identify the 
heterogeneity in the effects. In Tables 9 and 10 we do this by reporting predicted probabilities of labor 
force participation and quasi-elasticities of labor market participation for different types of (hypothetical) 
individuals. Table 8 is for women born in non-Western countries and Table 9 is for women born in 
Norway. For women born in non-Western countries we consider 28 different cases, whereas for women 
born in Norway we consider 36 different cases. In order to reduce the number of simulations and since the 
quasi-elasticity with respect to non-labor income is quite small for both groups, we set the level of real 
labor income to 380,000 NOK (at 2010 prices) in all the calculations for immigrants and to 490,000 NOK 
for most of the calculations for women born in Norway. These values correspond to the median values in 
our samples used in the estimation of the model. Since the two groups of women also vary systematically 
with respect to wage rate and job probability, the assumptions being made about the level of these 
variables also vary systematically in the simulations. Note, then, that for a specific variable (w or q) and 
for a specific group of women, the lowest value used in the simulations corresponds (approximately) to 
the first decile in the distribution of that variable in our sample, the highest value is the ninth decile, and 
the value in the middle is the median value. 
 
Looking at the results in Table 9, we see that for women born in non-Western countries the predicted 
probabilities of labor market participation vary from 0.267 to 0.995. The lowest probability is found for a 
woman aged 45 with a wage equal to 100 NOK (at 2010 prices), with five children, where four of the 
children are in the oldest age group and the last child is in the next oldest age group, and with a job 
probability (q) of 0.75. The highest predicted probability is found for a childless woman aged 30 years 
with a predicted wage equal to 350 NOK and with a job probability equal to 0.95. This latter group of 
women is also the one with the lowest quasi-wage elasticity, whereas one of the cases giving the largest 
quasi-wage elasticity is women aged 30 years with a wage of 100 NOK, with one child in the youngest 
age group and with a value of q equal to 0.75. This is tied by a woman aged 45 with a wage of 100 NOK, 
with two children, one in each of the two oldest child groups, and with a value of q equal to 0.75.  
 
Although showing some variation, the real non-labor income quasi-elasticity is moderate in all cases. The 
quasi-unemployment elasticity, which is negative in all cases, shows considerable variation. The highest 
elasticity (in absolute value) is obtained for a 30-year-old woman with a wage of 100 NOK (at 2010 
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prices), one child in the youngest age group and with a job probability of 0.75. This position is tied by the 
last-mentioned woman with the largest quasi-wage elasticity. The smallest elasticity (in absolute value) is 
found for a childless 30-year-old woman with a wage of 350 NOK and a job probability of 0.95. 
By comparing the results in Table 8 and Table 9, we notice that the predicted labor force participation 
probabilities for (hypothetical) women born in Norway are generally at a higher level than those for 
women born in non-Western countries. The smallest quasi-wage elasticity is found for a childless 30-year-
old woman with a real wage equal to 305 NOK (at 2010 prices) and with a job probability of 0.99, 
whereas the largest quasi-wage elasticity is found for a 30-year-old woman, with an hourly wage equal to 
180 NOK and non-labor income equal to 380,000 NOK, with three children, one in each of the age 
groups, and a job probability of 0.75. All the calculated real non-labor income elasticities are fairly small, 
varying from -0.001 to -0.123. The predicted quasi-unemployment elasticities vary substantially across the 
different types of hypothetical women born in Norway. The largest elasticity (in absolute value) is found 
for a 30-year-old woman with a real hourly wage equal to 180 NOK, with three children, one in each of 
the age groups. The lowest quasi-unemployment elasticity (in absolute value) is found for a childless 
woman with a real wage equal to 305 NOK and with a job probability of 0.99. 
 
Table 6. Mean quasi-elasticities of labor market participation probabilities 
 
Year 
Women born in non-Western 
countries 
 Women born in Norway 
P
WE  4
P
VE  (1 )P qE −   PWE  4
P
VE  (1 )P qE −  
1988 0.573 -0.026 -0.561  0.551 -0.045 -1.380 
1992 0.563 -0.027 -0.769  0.467 -0.039 -1.175 
1996 0.565 -0.029 -0.741  0.426 -0.038 -1.069 
2000 0.455 -0.025 -0.501  0.297 -0.029 -0.736 
2004 0.448 -0.025 -0.539  0.244 -0.027 -0.608 
2007 0.357 -0.026 -0.348  0.176 -0.023 -0.424 
2010 0.293 -0.024 -0.282  0.124 -0.017 -0.294 
 
Table 7. Mean quasi-elasticities of discouraged worker effects  
 Women born in non-Western countries  Women born in Norway 
Year D
WE  4
D
VE   DWE  4
D
VE  
1988 -0.053 0.002  -0.114 0.009 
1992 -0.077 0.003  -0.109 0.009 
1996 -0.101 0.005  -0.099 0.008 
2000 -0.086 0.004  -0.065 0.006 
2004 -0.103 0.005  -0.060 0.006 
2007 -0.053 0.003  -0.024 0.003 
2010 -0.051 0.004  -0.014 0.002 
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Table 8. Participation rates and quasi-elasticities for different types of female immigrants from non-Western countries 
Case Real 
wage ratea 
Non-labor 
incomea 
Age 
Number of 
children aged 
0–3 years 
Number of 
children 
aged 4–6 
years 
Number of 
children 
aged 7–18 
years 
Probability of 
getting an 
acceptable job 
given search 
Probability 
of labor 
force 
participation 
Quasi-wage 
elasticity 
Quasi-non-
labor income 
elasticity 
Quasi-
unemploy-
ment 
elasticity 
1 180 380,000 30 0 0 0 0.75 0.933 0.188 -0.013 -0.252 
2 180 380,000 30 0 0 0 0.85 0.952 0.137 -0.010 -0.143 
3 180 380,000 30 0 0 0 0.95 0.963 0.106 -0.007 -0.089 
4 180 380,000 30 1 0 0 0.75 0.847 0.390 -0.027 -0.522 
5 180 380,000 30 1 0 0 0.85 0.888 0.300 -0.021 -0.313 
6 180 380,000 30 1 0 0 0.95 0.913 0.239 -0.017 -0.200 
7 180 380,000 30 1 1 1 0.75 0.764 0.543 -0.038 -0.727 
8 180 380,000 30 1 1 1 0.85 0.822 0.440 -0.031 -0.459 
9 100 380,000 30 0 0 0 0.75 0.703 0.628 -0.044 -0.842 
10 100 380,000 30 0 0 0 0.85 0.772 0.530 -0.037 -0.553 
11 100 380,000 30 1 0 0 0.75 0.486 0.752 -0.052 -1.008 
12 100 380,000 30 1 0 0 0.85 0.574 0.736 -0.051 -0.768 
13 100 380,000 30 1 1 1 0.75 0.356 0.690 -0.048 -0.924 
14 100 380,000 30 1 1 1 0.85 0.441 0.742 -0.052 -0.774 
15 350 380,000 30 0 0 0 0.85      0.993 0.020 -0.001 -0.021 
16 350 380,000 30 0 0 0 0.95 0.995 0.015 -0.001 -0.013 
17 350 380,000 30 1 0 0 0.85 0.983 0.050 -0.003 -0.052 
18 350 380,000 30 1 0 0 0.95 0.987 0.038 -0.003 -0.032 
19 350 380,000 30 1 1 1 0.85 0.972 0.083 -0.006 -0.087 
20 350 380,000 30 1 1 1 0.95 0.978 0.064 -0.004 -0.053 
21 100 380,000 45 0 1 1 0.75 0.488 0.752 -0.052 -1.008 
22 100 380,000 45 0 1 1 0.85 0.576 0.735 -0.051 -0.767 
23 100 380,000 45 0 1 4 0.75 0.267 0.589 -0.041 -0.789 
24 100 380,000 45 0 1 4 0.85 0.342 0.678 -0.047 -0.707 
25 180 380,000 45 0 1 1 0.75 0.848 0.388 -0.027 -0.520 
26 180 380,000 45 0 1 1 0.85 0.889 0.298 -0.021 -0.311 
27 180 380,000 45 0 1 4 0.75 0.681 0.654 -0.045 -0.876 
28 180 380,000 45 0 1 4 0.85 0.753 0.560 -0.039 -0.584 
a At constant 2010 NOK prices. 
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Table 9. Participation rates and quasi-elasticities for different types of females born in Norway 
Case Real 
wage ratea 
Non-labor 
incomea 
Age 
Number of 
children aged 
0–3 years 
Number of 
children 
aged 4–6 
years 
Number of 
children 
aged 7–18 
years 
Probability of 
getting an 
acceptable job 
given search 
Probability 
of labor 
force 
participation 
Quasi-wage 
elasticity 
Quasi-non-
labor income 
elasticity 
Quasi-
unemploy-
ment 
elasticity 
1 205 490,000 30 0 0 0 0.95 0.990 0.040 -0.005 -0.103 
2 205 490,000 30 0 0 0 0.975 0.993 0.031 -0.004 -0.075 
3 205 490,000 30 0 0 0 0.99 0.994 0.027 -0.003 -0.063 
4 205 490,000 30 1 0 0 0.95 0.978 0.091 -0.011 -0.232 
5 205 490,000 30 1 0 0 0.975 0.983 0.070 -0.009 -0.171 
6 205 490,000 30 1 0 0 0.99 0.985 0.061 -0.007 -0.143 
7 205 490,000 30 1 1 1 0.95 0.946 0.217 -0.026 -0.554 
8 205 490,000 30 1 1 1 0.975 0.958 0.171 -0.021 -0.414 
9 140 490,000 30 0 0 0 0.95 0.954 0.187 -0.023 -0.478 
10 140 490,000 30 0 0 0 0.975 0.964 0.147 -0.018 -0.357 
11 140 490,000 30 1 0 0 0.95 0.899 0.385 -0.047 -0.985 
12 140 490,000 30 1 0 0 0.975 0.920 0.311 -0.038 -0.753 
13 140 490,000 30 1 1 1 0.95 0.777 0.735 -0.090 -1.878 
14 140 490,000 30 1 1 1 0.975 0.819 0.628 -0.077 -1.523 
15 305 490,000 30 0 0 0 0.975 0.999 0.006 -0.001 -0.014 
16 305 490,000 30 0 0 0 0.99 0.999 0.005 -0.001 -0.012 
17 305 490,000 30 1 0 0 0.975 0.997 0.013 -0.002 -0.033 
18 305 490,000 30 1 0 0 0.99 0.997 0.012 -0.001 -0.027 
19 305 490,000 30 1 1 1 0.975 0.992 0.034 -0.004 -0.082 
20 305 490,000 30 1 1 1 0.99 0.993 0.029 -0.004 -0.069 
21 140 490,000 45 0 1 1 0.95 0.802 0.673 -0.082 -1.721 
22 140 490,000 45 0 1 1 0.975 0.841 0.568 -0.069 -1.379 
23 140 490,000 45 0 1 4 0.95 0.611 1.007 -0.123 -2.575 
24 140 490,000 45 0 1 4 0.975 0.671 0.935 -0.114 -2.269 
25 205 490,000 45 0 1 1 0.95 0.953 0.189 -0.023 -0.483 
26 205 490,000 45 0 1 1 0.975 0.964 0.148 -0.018 -0.360 
27 205 490,000 45 0 1 4 0.95 0.888 0.423 -0.052 -1.081 
28 205 490,000 45 0 1 4 0.975 0.911 0.343 -0.042 -0.831 
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Table 9. (Continued) 
Case Real 
wage ratea 
Non-labor 
incomea 
Age 
Number of 
children aged 
0–3 years 
Number of 
children 
aged 4–6 
years 
Number of 
children 
aged 7–18 
years 
Probability of 
getting an 
acceptable job 
given search 
Probability 
of labor 
force 
participation 
Quasi-wage 
elasticity 
Quasi-non-
labor income 
elasticity 
Quasi-
unemploy-
ment 
elasticity 
29 180 380,000 30 0 0 0 0.75 0.812 0.647 -0.061 -2.654 
30 180 380,000 30 0 0 0 0.85 0.952 0.192 -0.018 -0.614 
31 180 380,000 30 0 0 0 0.95 0.985 0.061 -0.006 -0.157 
32 180 380,000 30 1 0 0 0.75 0.651 0.963 -0.091 -3.951 
33 180 380,000 30 1 0 0 0.85 0.896 0.395 -0.037 -1.260 
34 180 380,000 30 1 0 0 0.95 0.967 0.137 -0.013 -0.350 
35 180 380,000 30 1 1 1 0.75 0.422 1.033 -0.098 -4.237 
36 180 380,000 30 1 1 1 0.85 0.772 0.747 -0.071 -2.384 
a At constant 2010 NOK prices. 
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8. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have analyzed labor force participation and the discouraged worker phenomenon for 
married immigrant women and married women born in Norway. We have demonstrated that our 
empirical model is consistent with a search theoretic framework based on aggregate rational 
expectation. The model is estimated separately for immigrant women from non-Western countries and 
women born in Norway. According to our estimation results, the two groups differ with respect to the 
estimate of the search cost per unit of time. Women born in Norway have higher probabilities of 
getting acceptable job offers, but they also have considerably higher estimated search cost per unit of 
time compared to immigrant women. A likely explanation for the latter feature is that the 
environments immigrant women are used to are much more demanding than the Norwegian one, and 
thus they may be accustomed to using more effort in order to achieve results. In total, however, the 
proportion of discouraged workers is significantly higher for some groups of immigrant women than 
for women born in Norway. The reason is that the probabilities of getting an acceptable job are 
substantially lower for immigrant women compared to women born in Norway.  
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Appendix A 
Proof of Theorem 1: 
From (2.4) we have that 
  1 1 2(( ( ) ) ( )) ( ( ) max( ( ), ( ))) ( ( ).p p p pE S R U S E S E U S U S E C S)+ E SψΛ + = Λ −  
Recall that E  is the conditional expectation operator given the information of the agent. From the law 
of the iterated expectation we have that ( ) = ( ).p pE E E⋅ ⋅  Hence, we obtain from the above equation and 
Assumption 1 that 
(A.1)       1 1 2( ) max( ( ), ( ))pr u E U S U S cl l+ = −  
where we recall that ,pr E R=  ( )pc E C S=  , and ( ).pE Sl = Λ  Under IIA, it follows from Yellott 
(1977) that the error terms are distributed according to the type III extreme value distribution,  
(A.2)        1( ) ( ( ) ) exp( exp(0.5772 )),jP x P S x xε ε≤ = ≤ = − −  
j = 0, 2. Given the distribution in (A.2) it follows readily (and it is also well-known) that 
(A.3)       11 2 1 2 1 2(max( ( ), ( )) max( ( ), ( )) log(exp( ) exp( )).p pE E U S U S E U S U S u uθ θ θ
−= = +  
It thus follows from (A.1) and (A.3) that  
    1 1 21 log(exp( ) exp( ))
r cu u uθ θ θ
l l
 + + = + 
 
 
which completes the proof. 
            Q.E.D. 
Lemma 1 
 Assume that , 1,2,jV j =  are independent stable random variables that are distributed as 
(1,1,0)Sα  with 1,α <  and let ( )1 2log .Z V Vα= 7 Then the p.d.f.  of Z is given by 
   ( )
( )
sin
( )
2cos( )z z
f z
e e
απ
π απ −
=
+ +
. 
  
                                                     
7 The notation ( , , )Sα σ β µ  means a Stable distribution with index ,α  scale parameter ,σ  skewness parameter β  and 
location parameter .µ    
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Proof of Lemma 1: 
Since , 1,2,jV j =  are independent with c.d.f. (1,1,0)Sα  it follows that the event 
1Z zα− ≤  is 
equivalent to 
(A.4)   1 2( ) 0,
( )
zV e VU z
zσ
−
≡ ≤  
where ( )zσ  is the scale parameter of the Stable random variable ( )U z . From Property 1.2.1 in 
Samorodnitsky and Taqqu (1994, p. 10), it follows that the scale and the skewness parameters of ( )U z  
are one and ( ),zβ  respectively, where the latter is given by 
(A.5)   1( ) .
1
z
z
ez
e
α
αβ
−
=
+
 
From Zolotarev (1986, equation (2.2.30), p. 79), it follows that  
(A.6)   ( )
( )1 11 1( ) ( ) 0 Arctan
2 1
z
z
e
P Z z P U z
e
α
α
ψ
α
απ
−
 −
 ≤ = ≤ = −
 + 
 
where tan( / 2).ψ α= π  From (A.6) it follows that the probability density of the c.d.f. of  1Zα−  is given 
by 
(A.7)          
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( )
2 2 2 22 2
2
2 2
2 2
2
1 1 1 21
1 1
sin sin
.
2cos( )cos sin
z z
z z
z
z
z zz
e e
e e
e
e
e ee
α α
α α
α
α
α αα
ψ ψ
π ψ ψ ψπ ψ
ψ ψ
απ απ
π αππ απ απ
−
=
  + + −    − + − +     + +     
= =
+ ++ +
 
But (A.7) means that the p.d.f. of  Z  is given by 
  ( )
( )
sin
( ) .
2cos( )z z
f z
e e
απ
απ απ −
=
+ +
 
   Q.E.D. 
Proof of Theorem 2: 
Assumptions 2 and 4 imply that the utility functions can be expressed as 
  ,ijt ijt ij ijtU u Zθ ε= + +   for j = 0, 1, 2. 
When { }ijZ  are given we obtain from Assumption 4 and Yellott (1977) that ijtε  must have the same 
distribution as ijtαε  where α is a suitable constant and ijtε  has c.d.f. given by (A.2). Consequently, 
ij ijtZ αε+  must have the same distribution as ,ijtε for j = 0, 1, 2. Since 
0.5772( ) exp( )yijtP y eε
−≤ = −  and 
35 
  
1 10.5772( ) ( | ) exp( )ijZ yij ijt ijt ij ijP Z y EP y Z Z E e
α ααε αε
− −+ −+ ≤ = ≤ − = −   
we obtain that  
(A.8)  
1 10.5772 0.5772exp( ) exp( ).ijZ y yE e eα α
− −+ − −− = −  
Let 
10.5775 yz e α
−−=  which yields that 0.5772 0.5772(1 ) .ye z eα α− −=  When inserting for z in (A.8) we get 
(A.9)  
1 0.5772(1 )exp( ) exp( )ijZE ze z eα α α
−
−− = −  
for 0.z ≥  We recognize the left hand side of (A.9) as the Laplace transform of the distribution of 
1exp( ).ijZ α
−
 From Proposition 1.2.12 in Samorodnitsky and Taqqu  (1994, p. 15), it follows that 
1exp( )ijZ α
−
 must be an α stable random variable that is maximally skew to the right with location 
parameter equal to zero. It also follows that the scale parameter σ  is given by 
10.5772(1 ) cos( / 2).eα ασ απ
−−=  The latter equation implies that cos( / 2)απ  is non-negative, which can 
only happen if 1.α ≤  From Lemma 1 we therefore obtain that 11 0( )i iZ Z α
−−  must have p.d.f. given by 
   1 sin( ) .
2cos( )z ze eα α
απ
π απ−
⋅
+ +
 
Recall that 
1 1 1 .ijt ijt ij ijtU u Zα θ α α ε
− − −= + +  Since the error terms are independent and extreme value 
distributed it follows from the theory of discrete choice that the maximization of the utility function 
1
ijtU α
−
conditional on { }ikZ  (which is equivalent to maximizing ijt
U  conditional on { })ikZ  yields 
(2.8). Since also  ijt ijt ijtU uθ ε= +  we obtain (2.9).  
 In order to prove (2.10) we use the fact that 21 0 1( ) 2 / 3.i t i t i tVar Varε ε ε π− = =  Since  
1 0( )i t i t iZε ε α− +  has the same distribution as 1 0i t i tε ε− it follows that  
2
1 0 1 0 1 0(( ) ) ( ) ( )i t i t i i t i t i i t i tVar Z Var VarZ Varε ε α α ε ε ε ε− + = − + = −  
from which (2.10) follows. 
           Q.E.D. 
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Figure A1. Plot of the p.d.f. of 1iZ α−  and the p.d.f. of a normal distribution (dotted line) 
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Appendix B 
Generating independent draws from the p.d.f. given in (2.11) 
Let riX , r = 1, 2, …, M, be normally distributed N(0,1) and let ( )xΦ  denote the standard normal c.d.f. 
Let g be the p.d.f.  
(B.1)   1 sin( )( )
2cos( )b z z
bg z
b e e b
π
π π−
= ⋅
+ +
 
where b is a positive scalar. Define the random variable  
(B.2)  ( )
( )
tan( / 2) tan (2 ( ) 1) / 2
( ) log
tan( / 2) tan (2 ( ) 1) / 2
ri
ri
ri
b X b
K b
b X b
π π
π π
 + Φ −
=   − Φ − 
 
 
for r = 1, 2,…,M, for individual i. The variable ( )riK b  will then be distributed according to (B.1). 
Thus, one can simulate random variables from g(y) by first draw independent standard normally 
distributed random variables and subsequently use (B.2) to calculate these random variables. Note 
next that ( ) /irK α α  has p.d.f. ( )f z  given in (2.11). Hence, we can write 
(B.3)  1 1
2 0
1( )
1 exp( ( (1 / 1) ( ) / )it i i t it i t ir
P Z
u c q u Kθα θ θα α α− −
=
+ − − − − +
. 
 
The simulation procedure goes as follows: Let for example 0 0.5b α= =  be the starting value. Given 
this value of b one can generate 0( )riK α  by using (B.2). Then by plugging in the formula in (B.3) into 
the likelihood function with 0( )ir irK K α=  one can obtain a new estimate of ,α  1.α α=  Use this new 
value of α to generate 1( ).irK α  Then the procedure is repeated until convergence is obtained. 
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Appendix C 
C.1. Estimation results for the wage equation 
Table C1 displays the estimation results for the wage equations. Most of the variables enter the real 
wage equations in a significant manner. The estimated return on education is somewhat larger for 
women born in Norway than for women born in non-western countries. In both equations experience 
has a positive effect on the real wage, but it is not easy to compare the results for the two groups since 
experience and duration of stay, for immigrant women, to some extent pick up similar features. The 
dummy for urbanity, which takes the value 1 if the woman lives in a densely populated area, enters, as 
expected, with a positive and significant value. For both groups the estimated time effects are all 
positive and increasing over time, accounting for general growth of real wages over time which is not 
due to changes in the other explanatory variables.  
 
Table C1. Estimates of wage equations  
Variables Women born in non-western 
countriesa 
Women born in Norway 
 Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Constant 4.083 53.67 4.110 445.94 
Education 0.036 11.06 0.042 86.15 
Experience 0.013 2.74 0.018 36.68 
Experience squared/100 -0.018 -1.68 -0.028 -27.61 
Dummy for urbanity   0.031 12.45 
Time since arrival/10 0.107 2.89   
Time since arrival squared/100 -0.013 -1.22   
D91T93 0.051 1.16 0.063 18.71 
D94T96 0.095 2.10 0.087 24.20 
D97T99 0.137 2.90 0.116 28.94 
D00T02 0.177 3.80 0.164 39.04 
D03T05 0.201 4.51 0.218 50.70 
D06T08 0.274 6.38 0.291 66.36 
D09T10 0.341 7.68 0.373 69.52 
Variance of random effect        0.118  0.222 
Variance of genuine error term        0.088  0.204 
# obs.        2,768  98,544 
Log-likelihood       -1,545.176  -14,439.094 
The variable D8890 is a dummy for the years 1988-1990, with a similar notation for the other time dummies. 
C.2. Estimation results for the job offer probability 
Table C2 shows the results from the estimation of the q-relations (probability of getting an acceptable 
job offer given search). As is evident from the estimation results in Table B2 model specifications are 
somewhat different with respect to explanatory variables. Work experience is included only in the 
specification for women born in Norway, while this variable is replaced by duration of stay for 
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immigrant women. For both groups the sets of explanatory variables are expanded by including the log 
of the real non-labor income and the number of children aged 0-3 years and 4-6 years, respectively. 
 
The education variable is significant in both relations, but the estimate of the coefficient attached to 
education in the equations for women born in non-western countries is only a third of the corresponding 
estimate for women born in Norway. Thus education is more important for job probability for women 
born in Norway than in non-western countries. For women born in Norway only the estimate of the 
coefficient attached to the linear term of experience is significant. As expected experience has a positive 
effect on the job probability. Both the linear and the quadratic terms of the duration of stay impact the 
job probability significantly. The estimate of the coefficient attached to the linear term is positive 
whereas the estimate of the coefficient of the quadratic term is negative. Log of real non-labor income 
enters both relations positively, but the size of the estimated coefficient attached to this variable is 
somewhat larger for immigrant women. Both the two variables on the number of children in two age 
groups enter with a negative effect on the job probability, and are mostly significant at the 5 percent 
level. For both groups the estimated effect of the variable indicating the number of children aged 4-6 
years is somewhat larger than for the number of children aged 0-3 years. The time dummies enter 
significantly for both groups and show a time variation that mirrors business cycle variation.   
 
Table C2. Estimates of the job offer probability q   
Variables Women born in non-western 
countriesa 
Women born in Norway 
 Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Education 0.081 5.494 0.243 26.175 
Experience   0.060 6.344 
Experience squared/100   -0.017 -0.891 
Time since arrival/10 1.201 5.978   
Time since arrival 
squared/100 
-0.179 -2.801   
log(real non-labor income) 0.260 3.691 0.154 4.906 
# children aged 0-3 -0.166 -1.829 -0.140 -3.599 
# children aged 4-6 -0.388 -3.978        -0.211 -5.350 
D88T90 -2.349 -2.615 -2.257 -5.556 
D91T93 -3.391 -3.960 -2.422 -5.955 
D94T96 -3.452 -4.019 -2.412 -5.904 
D97T99 -3.061 -3.481 -2.327 -5.627 
D00T02 -3.097 -3.480 -2.409 -5.772 
D03T05 -3.303 -3.741 -2.654 -6.316 
D06T08 -2.837 -3.178 -2.179 -5.101 
D09T10 -2.837 -3.157 -2.019 -5.566 
# obs. 3,459  107,444 
R2 0.075  0.015 
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Appendix D 
Further summary statistics 
Since our sample has been subjected to a number of selection criteria it may be of interest to know 
more about the sample than what is contained in Table 1 in Section 4. Hence, this section provides 
further summary statistics. 
 
Table D1. Distribution of women across area of birth and periods in the sample 
 Area of birtha 
Period Norway Region 3 Region 4 Region 5 Region 6 Region 8 
1988-1990 15267 38 19 84 38 24 
1991-1993 20862 70 34 171 73 37 
1994-1996 21054 133 45 219 123 39 
1997-1999 12397 101 28 156 62 35 
2000-2002 10956 124 30 131 69 24 
2003-2005 10504 174 36 173 139 26 
1996-2008 9389 185 38 224 142 64 
1999-2010 3773 137 16 114 56 17 
a Region 3 is Eastern Europe, Region 4 is Africa excluded the northern part, Region 5 is Asia excluded the western part, 
Region 6 is northern part of Africa and western part of Asia, Region 8 is South and Central America. 
 
Table D2. Transitions in the labor market for women born in Norway. Selected years 
 Women born in non-western 
countries 
Women born in Norway 
Variable No. of obs. Mean Std. dev. No. of obs. Mean Std. dev. 
Year 1988/1989:       
       
Outside to outside 29 0.310 0.47 2466 0.144 0.35 
Outside to particip. 29 0.103 0.31 2466 0.040 0.20 
Particip. to outside 29 0.034 0.19 2466 0.038 0.19 
Particip. to particip. 29 0.552 0.51 2466 0.779 0.42 
       
Year 1999/2000:       
       
Outside to outside 63 0.206 0.41 1874 0.053 0.22 
Outside to particip. 63 0.063 0.25 1874 0.030 0.17 
Particip. to outside 63 0.079 0.27 1874 0.021 0.14 
Particip. to particip. 63 0.651 0.48 1874 0.895 0.31 
       
Year 2009/2010:       
       
Outside to outside 120 0.100 0.30 1207 0.018 0.13 
Outside to particip. 120 0.075 0.26 1207 0.024 0.15 
Particip. to outside 120 0.042 0.20 1207 0.006 0.08 
Particip. to particip. 120 0.783 0.41 1207 0.952 0.21 
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Table D3. Trimming of hourly wage data in current value 
Year Women born in non-western countries Women born in Norway 
 Lower limit Upper limit Lower limit Upper limit 
1988 32.5 553.5 44.1 339.3 
1989 32.5 553.5 42.7 359.3 
1990 32.5 553.5 46.7 392.7 
1991 20.0 575.0 51.9 428.0 
1992 20.0 575.0 53.4 412.9 
1993 20.0 575.0 57.6 439.8 
1994 34.0 510.0 57.4 429.3 
1995 34.0 510.0 54.5 457.0 
1996 34.0 510.0 55.5 445.4 
1997 25.0 535.0 55.7 494.7 
1998 25.0 535.0 51.8 476.4 
1999 25.0 535.0 54.1 410.7 
2000 40.0 415.0 54.2 480.0 
2001 40.0 415.0 54.1 439.1 
2002 40.0 415.0 69.3 556.4 
2003 25.0 565.0 59.2 454.2 
2004 25.0 565.0 62.1 485.4 
2005 25.0 565.0 69.8 544.0 
2006 35.0 872.0 64.0 497.1 
2007 35.0 872.0 66.6 566.1 
2008 35.0 872.0 75.6 561.2 
2009 34.7 695.0 86.2 507.6 
2010 34.7 695.0 98.9 568.6 
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Table D4. Trimming of non-labor income in current value 
Year Women born in non-western countries Women born in Norway 
 Upper limit Upper limit 
1988 885788.9 1018657.3 
1989 880811.7 1012933.4 
1990 885385.1 1018192.8 
1991 895047.8 1029304.9 
1992 898789.7 1033608.1 
1993 906564.4 1042549.1 
1994 919655.9 1057604.3 
1995 935785.2 1076153.0 
1996 963600.8 1108140.9 
1997 989081.2 1137443.4 
1998 1029866.1 1184346.0 
1999 1059603.9 1218544.5 
2000 1082010.5 1244312.1 
2001 1120587.0 1288675.1 
2002 1173313.4 1349310.4 
2003 1193343.9 1372345.5 
2004 1222178.5 1405505.3 
2005 1249802.0 1437272.3 
2006 1292636.9 1486532.4 
2007 1350496.4 1553070.8 
2008 1374010.3 1580111.8 
2009 1411127.5 1622796.6 
2010 1418393.8 1631152.8 
 
Table D5. Summary statistics for the predicted probability of getting an acceptable job given 
search (in per cent) 
 Women born in non-western countries Women born in Norway 
 Year Year 
Statistics 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 
Mean 91.1 85.7 90.7 96.8 97.4 98.9 
Std. deviation 6.0 7.4 5.4 1.9 1.9 0.8 
100% (Max) 98.7 97.9 98.4 99.8 99.7 99.9 
90% 97.5 94.5 96.6 98.8 99.2 99.6 
75% 96.2 91.0 94.6 98.2 98.6 99.4 
50% (Median) 92.7 86.6 91.8 97.3 97.9 99.1 
25% 88.2 81.5 87.4 95.9 96.8 98.6 
10% 82.1 74.2 83.6 94.1 95.0 98.0 
0% (Min) 68.6 63.0 71.3 85.3 86.7 92.9 
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Appendix E 
Comparison with results obtained by Dagsvik et al. (2013) 
In Dagsvik et al. (2013) we analyzed the discouraged effect for women living in Norway using pure 
cross-section data for the period 1988 to 2002. In order to compare the current estimates with those 
obtained by Dagsvik et al. (2013) we have transformed the parameter estimates of Table 2 so as to 
make them comparable. They are given in Table E1. Apart from the estimated parameter associated 
with the discouraged worker effect the estimated parameters do not differ much from the estimates 
reported in Table 2 in Dagsvik et al. (2013). 
Table E1. Derived parameter estimates for women born in Norway and in non-western countries 
using predicted log real hourly wage with the random component set to zero 
 Women born in non-
western countries 
Women born in Norway 
Variable/parameter Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
dw , cθ    2.269 7.494 9.774 16.580 
Constant, θγ1  -14.258 -7.206 -17.770 -32.990 
Age, θγ2 0.140 2.287 0.080 5.486 
(Age/10)2, θγ3 -0.220 -2.905 -0.168 -9.966 
(real non-lab. inc)×  10-5, θγ4 -0.055 -1.923 -0.105 -15.476 
No. of children 0-3, θγ5 -0.919 -9.903 -0.841 -33.504 
No. of children 4-6, θγ6 -0.218 -2.280 -0.621 -24.737 
No. of children 7-18, θγ7 -0.320 -6.540 -0.316 -20.040 
Standard errors are calculated by the delta method. 
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